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EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
TO WORKFARE AND LEARNFARE
MARK ANTHONY DRUMBL*
RESUME
Depuis quelques temps, on s'int6resse de plus en plus aux concepts de programmes de travail et de programmes de formation obligatoires Al'intention des
b6n6ficiaires d'aide sociale. Dans cet article, l'auteur examine les arguments en
mati~re de politiques sociales qui sont en faveur ou qui s'opposent Aces types
de programmes. I1 les 6tudie 6galement selon la perspective de la Charte des
droits. II conclut que les programmes de travail et de formation obligatoires
peuvent faire l'objet de contestation en vertu de la Charte des droits Amoins
qu'on y adhere librement ou qu'ils soient soigneusement 61abor6s.

Without work all life goes rotten. But
when work is soulless, life stifles and dies.
- Albert Camus
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A.

INTRODUCTION
Social assistance reform is rapidly becoming a central element in the agora of
Canadian politics. Academics, politicians, and the general public are demon-

strating a growing desire to overhaul Canada's welfare programs.' These initiatives emanate partly from economic concerns: as the end of the current recession

still seems far from near, many feel that the number of "government dependants" 2 needs to be reduced. 3 Yet, for the large part, these economic concerns
mask a more fundamental attitudinal shift on the part of the "haves" towards the
"have-nots". Political discourse is orienting itself away from the notion that
4
a person in need has a "right" to receive welfare to one in which recipients

I.

G. York, "Grits vow radical social reform", The Globe and Mail (1 February 1994) A1.
Federal Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin is actively considering implementing workfare programs on First Nations reserves, stripping recipients of their benefits should
they refuse to do community work: Canadian Press, QL National General News, May
8, 1994. Provincial governments, responsible for social assistance, have also been vocal
in this area. In Ontario, the Social Assistance Review Committee proposed that receipt
of welfare should be closely tied to work, job search and schooling requirements:
Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1988) [hereinafter the Transitions Report or simply Transitions]; a position
taken by the current government in Turning Point: White Paper on Welfare Reform
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1993) [hereinafter Turning Point]. The Ontario Progressive
Conservative Party in its 1994 policy paper The Common Sense Revolution expressly promises mandatory community service, workfare and learnfare for welfare recipients. New
Brunswick has also recently proposed a vigorous workfare-style scheme in Creating New
Options (Fredericton: Department of Income Assistance, December 1993): see section
B(2)(b)(ii) of this article. The Finance Ministers of Alberta and Saskatchewan have also
indicated a willingness to seriously consider workfare: Canadian Press, QL National General News, December 1, 1993. Nova Scotia Social Services Minister Jim Smith recently
announced that his government will force people on welfare to get retraining in order to continue to receive benefits: Canadian Press, QL National General News, March 25, 1994.

2.

Although this article focuses on welfare recipients, the ideology of workfare could
apply to all sources of assistance from the state, including unemployment insurance
benefits. Many of the constitutional arguments raised by this article apply to more persons than simply welfare recipients.

3.

C. Mclnnes, "Ontario welfare reform to undergo major cutback", The Globe and Mail
(4 March 1994) A4. The dramatic increase in the number of persons on welfare has
placed upward pressure on the costs of these programs. P. Rochman, in "Working for
Welfare: A Response to the Social Assistance Review Committee" (1989), 5 J.L.&
Social Pol. 198 at 201 notes that between 1969 and 1987 the number of persons on
social assistance increased in Ontario by 175%. Of more immediate concern is the fact
that, at present, 1.3 million Ontario residents (including 1 in every 5 children in the
province) rely on social assistance for the basics of survival; this figure has doubled
since 1990: Canadian Press, QL Government News, March 21, 1994. The costs and
caseloads of the Ontario social assistance system have more than doubled in the last
three years, principally due to the recession: Canadian Press, QL Quebec-Ontario
Regional News, February 4, 1994. These figures are indicative of trends across Canada.

4.

This position is summed up by Ian Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charterand Constitu-
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are to be bound by a "reciprocal obligation" to "pay back" the state for
whatever benefits they acquire. 5 The "pay back" requirement often entails
that welfare benefits are to be "earned" through "responsible behaviour".
These attitudinal shifts correspond with an "individualized" view of the
origins of poverty: instead of perceiving poverty as emanating from structural factors, it is believed to flow from the misconduct and irresponsibility
6
of the recipient.
Within the ranks of those promulgating the "reciprocal obligation" approach are
the voices of those proposing the implementation of "workfare" schemes. 7 This
chorus increasingly includes both economists 8 as well as the state officials
responsible for administering the allocation of social assistance. 9 Workfare, in
a nutshell, means that social assistance recipients must engage in certain
activities mandated by the state-for example planting trees, proving they are
looking for employment, completing community service-in order to continue
tionally Protected Welfare" (1988), 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1 at 9: "Welfare entitlements
are conceived as rights, not favours-a fulfilment of the ideal that each person [is] entitled to his/her due as citizen and individual deserving of dignity. In liberal egalitarian
theory, welfare is among those rights that are essential to the enjoyment of all other
rights".
5.

Turning Point, supra, note 1; Transitions,supra, note 1; CreatingNew Options, supra,
note 1; J. Weinberg, "The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and
Poor Women", (1991) 26 New England Law Rev. 415 at 421; Rochman, supra, note 3
at 201 cites a Gallup Poll which found that 84% of Canadians believe that welfare
recipients should be made to work as a condition of welfare: Toronto Star (1 December
1988) A3.

6.

T. Corbett et al., "Learnfare: The Wisconsin Experience" (1989), 12 Focus 1 [hereinafter Corbett.], cited in J. Mosher, "Law's Response to Poverty" (U. of T., 1994) at 442
[hereinafter Mosher].

7.

L. Mead, Welfare: Reform or Replacement?, Subcommittee on Social Security and
Family Policy of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, February 23, 1987 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing House).

8.

Judith Maxwell, former chairperson of the Economic Council of Canada, has called for
the implementation of mandatory community-service through a Job Corps and training
programs in which all unemployed Canadians under the age of 25 would participate: G.
York, "Social Programs Called Outdated", Globe and Mail (17 November 1994) Al.

9.

On January 31, 1994, Federal Human Resources Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced
that Canada's social security network is in need of significant reforms. According to
York, supra, note I at A 1:"The key to the government's reforms is the idea of 'rewarding effort' by the unemployed. Those who refuse to enrol in job training, apprenticeship, literacy, community service or other government programs could suffer a
financialpenalty [emphasis mine]." Although social assistance falls under the legislative authority of the provinces, federal policies in this area are important, especially as
they mould federal approaches to cost-sharing, upon which many provincial initiatives
are dependent.
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to receive benefits.' 0 There is no shortage of scholarly literature discussing the
economics of workfare. Nor is there any lack of academic debate regarding the
policy merit of such programs. However, one area that has received little
academic or judicial attention11 involves the constitutional limits to the
implementation of workfare schemes12 ; and this despite the fact that from a
policy planning perspective, it is clearly unwise to enact any program scheme
that risks violating the rights guarantees contained in the CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedoms.13
This article shall first consider whether absolute workfare-for instance
whether a welfare recipient can be obliged to pave a road at the state's behestcan survive Charterscrutiny. It is submitted that the likelihood of such unfettered schemes satisfying the substantive rights guarantees provided by the
Charter is low. With this analysis as a starting point, this article shall then
explore whether less coercive "reciprocal obligation" programs-such as conditioning benefits upon a mandatory job search-would hold constitutional
muster and, if so, to what extent.
The "entitlement" to social assistance is being unilaterally removed from our
social contract. Today, as throughout history, the rules governing the relationship between the "haves" and "have-nots" are not being written at a level of
equal bargaining power: on one side there is the state, with all its resources, and
on the other, a scattered group of individuals dependent on the state for economic
survival. The Chartercan help equalize the playing field by reducing the ability
of the state to manage the lives of welfare recipients. Although in the past the

10.

A narrow definition of workfare would limit workfare to programs providing benefits to
recipients in exchange for mandatory work participation. The broader definition of
"workfare" used in this article has also been propounded by scholars. For example, S.
Smart, "A STEP toward Workfare: The Supports to Employment Program and Sole
Support Mothers" (1990), 6 J.L.& Soc. Pol'y 226 at 252 uses the term "workfare" to
denote "...a program where entitlement to benefits is conditional upon participation in
activities intended to lead to employment or increase employability."

11.

Both in Canada and the U.S. The only Canadian case in which a workfare scheme was
challenged on constitutional grounds is Gosselin v. Quebec (Procureur geniral),
[ 1992] R.J.Q. 1647 (C.S.), discussed below.

12.

Johnstone, supra, note 4 at 47 writes that: "If workfare is instituted in Canada, as it may
well be in certain provinces, it is submitted that subjecting it to scrutiny under...the
Charter is an appropriate and essential role for the judiciary. The implications for dignity and self-respect make it manifestly clear that the creation, design, and administration of such programs cannot be left exclusively to the political process, and that
judicial scrutiny should be a constitutional imperative."

13.

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter].
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Charter has not occupied a purposive role in promoting the well-being of the
class of persons receiving social assistance, this does not necessarily mean that
14
it can never play such a part.

B. THE IDEOLOGY AND PRAXIS OF WORKFARE
(1) Ideological Underpinnings
Workfare programs are far from homogeneous. As shall become apparent in the
following discussion, the term "workfare" covers a plethora of social assistance
programs. Nevertheless, these programs differ more in degree than in kind and
consequently can all be placed on the same ideological continuum. This continuum
is predicated on the belief that assistance is not to be automatically given to a "person
in need" for as long as that person remains in need. Instead, a person in need can
be disentitled from receiving benefits merely due to the fact that she fails to
participate in certain state-run obligations. Not meeting these requirements causes
a person to slip from the "deserving poor" to the ranks of the "undeserving poor".15
It is the obligatory requirement to continue to do something after having qualified
as a "person in need" in order to remain eligible for benefits that distinguishes
workfare from other forms of social assistance such as child allowances and tax
credits which do not involve such behaviour monitoring. For many advocates of
workfare, the exact nature of the required activity is of minor importance:
My interpretation is that obligation is what makes the programs tick. It is essential that some activity be required of recipients. It is much less critical what that
activity is. Job search, training and education as well as immediate work in
government can promote employment-provided they are mandatory [emphasis

mine].

16

Proponents of workfare contend that it is not only the needs of the recipients
that must be addressed, but also the interests of the taxpayers funding social
assistance programs. Lawrence Mead argues that:
The public is humanitarian but not permissive. It doesn't want to simply give
things to people. It wants to give things to them but also to uphold social standards. This is why workfare is potentially attractive, because it speaks to both

14.

See also: M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to support social welfare
claims" (1993), 19 Queen's L.J. 65.

15.

For a discussion of the dividing-line between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor,
see L. Muszynski, "Work and Welfare: A Guide to Income Security Reform in Canada"
(Draft Paper prepared for the National Council on Welfare, 1988) at 41.

16.

Mead, supra, note 7 at 165, cited in Rochman, supra, note 3 at 212.
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sides of the public mind. It helps people but at the same time requires that they
17
.function in ways other people expect [emphasis mine].

Both workfare and learnfare presuppose that welfare recipients need guidance
in order to become "productive" members of society. In this sense, the requirements to participate in certain programs are animated by a moral paternalism
that assumes that the poor need to be "trained" or "put to work" in order to
develop the level of conscientiousness common to the "haves". 18 According to
Lawrence Mead:
The welfare poor have simply not been expected to work...The main reason the longterm poor (women, Blacks, teenagers) do not work steadily is problems of work discipline peculiarto them, not the limitations of the labour market [emphasis mine]. 19

In the end, however, such programs inhibit the recipient's transition towards
autonomy. They accomplish one of what Isaiah Berlin believes are to be among
the most offensive effects of paternalism: the denial of one's status as a
responsible agent. 20 Moreover, due to the fact that structurally disadvantaged
groups such as women and racial minorities comprise a disproportionately large
number of social assistance recipients, the limitations on individual autonomy
can exacerbate pre-existing historical inequalities.
(2) A Contemporary History of Workfare
(a) The American Experience
In the 1960's the welfare state that emerged out of Roosevelt's New Deal began to
actively incorporate workfare programs. The first of these was simply entitled Work
Incentives (WIN). 2 1 Although WIN was federally enacted, its actual enforcement
17.

L. Mead, Workfare versus Welfare, Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 97th
Congress, 2nd Session, April 23, 1986 (Washington: U.S.Government Printing Office,
1986) at 38.

18.

This view has also been labelled "behaviouralist" for it presupposes that state involvement in the management of the lives of those on welfare can foster civic responsibility
and thereby eviscerate the "culture of defeatism" alleged to cause poverty: M. Weiss,
"Reducing Poverty: Alternative Approaches", Currents (December 1992) 14. Within
the ambit of the behaviouralist theories, little allowance is made for the systemic and
structural roots of poverty, nor is attention paid to the claim that poverty and unemployment is a necessary by-product of capitalism.

19.

Mead, supra, note 17.

20.

I. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 157.

21.

42 U.S.C. paras. 630-45.
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was organized at the state level. Classes of recipients designated by the state
were mandated to register for work and, if offered a job, were obliged to accept
it (and thus lose welfare benefits in so far as the new work removed the recipient
from the ranks of those "in need") or forfeit their benefits. The states that
22
introduced a paid work requirement usually limited this to a 13 week period.
The effect of the WIN programs was not significant. According to Paula
Rochman, these programs were always poorly funded and failed in their effort
to place recipients into meaningful jobs. 2 3 In fact, in 1972, only 15% of WIN
participants were able to retain jobs more than 3 months after completing the
program. 24 Joanna Weinberg notes that many of these persons would likely have
found similar employment on their own, without participating in workfare. 25 In
his survey of WIN workfare programs, Richard Polangin found that:
Typical jobs are the washing of public vehicles, landscape maintenance or custodial work. Workfare jobs almost never
include training in marketable skills
26
(e.g. computer data entry or health care).

Amendments made to WIN during the Carter and Reagan administrations did
not render the program more effective; they instead increased the number of
part-time and temporary jobs given to participants. In 1977, Congress
enacted workfare programs under the ambit of the Food Stamp Act, with a view
to mandating at least one member from each food stamp household to "work
off" the household's allotment in a public service job. 27WOI%2More aggressive programs were enacted in 1988 with the adoption of the Family Support
Act. 28 This legislation mandates that states add to their public assistance
programs a provision that certain classes of AFDC 29 (Aid for Families with
22.

Rochman, supra,note 3 at 209.

23.

Ibid. at 207.

24.

Ibid. at 208.

25.

Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 429, notes that half of all AFDC recipients "...move off the
rolls, usually to ajob, within two years regardless of participation in any program."

26.

R. Polangin, "Conscripted Labor: Workfare and the Poor" (1982/3), 16 Clearinghouse
Review 544.

27.

"New Research Report on Workfare" (1982/3), 16 ClearinghouseReview 332.

28.

42 U.S.C. paras. 301-1397c (1988).

29.

AFDC is a rough parallel to welfare in Canada. AFDC recipients are predominantly single mothers. Persons exempted from the Family Support Act workfare programs
include: individuals who are ill, incapacitated,or over 65; persons needed in the home
because of the illness or incapacity of anotherfamily member; a caretakerparent of
children under 6; a person employed 30 hours or more; women in the last trimester of
pregnancy; non-principal-earnerparents in a two-parentfamily; and parents of chil-
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Dependent Children) recipients are to participate in an obligatory employment,
education and trainingprogram-entitledJOB S-inorderto continuetoreceive
assistance ° Participation targets are set: 7% of the eligible AFDC population
in 1991, rising to 20% in 1996. Failure on the part of a state to meet these
shall result in the reduction of federal funding. Given this constraint, many

American states have complied with the Family Support Act by introducing
31
workfare programs more extensive than under WIN.

There is one state program of particular interest: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN), introduced in California in 1985.32 It is fairly comprehensive in nature, featuring job search assistance, on the job training,
career assessment, adult basic education (literacy training), English as a
second language classes, as well as vocational education. It allocates funds
for child-care and transportation support services so as to permit many single
mothers to participate. 33 Nevertheless, despite the comprehensiveness of the
program, only 4% of participants find jobs that enable them to leave AFDC
once the program ends; 34 the income level of this small group rises from 8
to 37 % due to their new employment. 35 GAIN's inability to move recipients
off AFDC can be linked to the fact that it requires participants to accept any
job within their "employment goal", regardless of the salary, even if the end
result is a net loss of income due to the recipients' having to pay the child
care, transportation and medical expenses that the state would have defrayed
36
while the recipient was in the program.
dren under 3 in AFDC-U families.
30.

JOBS consolidates several pre-existing programs-WIN, the WIN demonstration project, Community Work Experience, as well as several work supplementation and job
search programs-into one administrative umbrella. According to para 681(a) of the
Family Support Act, the purpose of the JOBS is "to assure that needy families with
children obtain the education, training and employment that will help them avoid long
term welfare dependence".

31.

Rochman, supra, note 3 at 209.

32.

Greater Avenues of Independence Act of 1985, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code. para 111320
(West 1991).

33.

The provision of such funds is of paramount importance, especially (as shall be discussed in section C(2) of this article) if a workfare program is to avoid perpetuating discrimination against women in the labour market. Rochman, supra, note 3 at 210, notes
the failure of a mandatory Pennsylvania workfare scheme to attract women participants
(only 24% were women) due, in part, to the refusal of budget-makers to allot any funds
for child-care.

34.

Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 444.

35.

Rochman, supra, note 3 at 209.

36.

According to Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 449, the average rate of pay in such employ-
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Learnfare programs have also been adopted in several States. The best known
example is a fairly coercive scheme enacted in Wisconsin in 1988. 37 Under this
program, family will lose its AFDC grant for the entire amount designated for
any teen-age children (13 through 19 years of age) included in the grant if these
children either drop out of or fail to attend school on a regular basis. 38 Once a
student has ten unexcused 39 absences within a 6 month period or has dropped
out of school, that student becomes "monitored". Once "monitored", a student
cannot have more than two unexplained, full-day absences per month without
engendering a sanction against the student's family.
Although intended to combat truancy among secondary school students,
Wisconsin's learnfare has a highly punitive effect on all members of AFDC
dependent families. Critics note that sanction-induced class attendance will not
help children from disadvantaged backgrounds break the cycle of poverty. 40 On
another note, learnfare clearly places a burden on poor parents that is not felt by
the middle-class, for there -are no state sanctions on non-welfare dependent
families should their teen-age children fail to attend school.

ment hovers around the minimum wage (in California $4.50 per hour at the time of
writing). After work-related expenses are deducted, the total salary is less than the
AFDC allotment for many families. Weinberg also links these lower salaries to job
market trends: she notes at 450 that "...many of the new jobs created during the 1980's
paid substantially lower wages than the jobs lost, with minimum-wage service sector
jobs replacing higher paying factory and industrial work.
37.

1987 Wis. Laws 27; Wis. Admin. Code para [HHS] 201.195(1), (4)(a), (4)(b), (8)
(March 1990).

38.

In 1989, for a family consisting of a mother and two children, this sanction results in a
reduction of $77.60 a month from a total grant of $517.60. There is also an indication
that the requirement shall be extended to children aged 6 to 12: Corbett et al., in
Mosher, supra, note 6 at 442.

39.

Excused absences include: (1) the student has been expelled from school and alternative
schooling is not available; (2) the teen-age student has a child under 3 months of age;
(3) no licensed day-care is available for the children of teen parents subject to learnfare;
(4) there are prohibitive transportation problems; (5) the teen is over 16 years of age
and is not expected to graduate from high school by age 20.

40.

Corbett et al., in Mosher, supra, note 6 at 446. The program is faulted for its lack of
outreach and family intervention, the absence of in-depth fact-finding before the initiation of the sanction process, the lack of positive inducements, and the failure to ensure
the provision of a broad array of support services for learnfare students.

(1994) 10 Journalof Law and Social Policy

(b)

Workfare in Canada

(i)

Unfettered Workfare

Absolute "work for welfare" schemes are fairly uncommon in Canada. 4 1 The
most relevant example 42 of such a scheme is a policy enacted by the Saskatchewan government in 1984. 43 This program cut a recipient's monthly benefits
from $581.00 to $384.00 if s/he did not accept employment or job training
offered through the provincial program. The only exception, as in the WIN
system, was if the recipient could demonstrate that s/he was not employable.
Rochman notes that this system resulted in the creation of few permanent jobs,
but recipients forced to partake in the program built a golf course, cleared ditches
and constructed a health spa at a time when over 50% of park maintenance
workers were laid off due to a supposed lack of work. 44
Qu6bec has also implemented workfare-style legislation. In Qu6bec, social
assistance allowances are reduced for single employable persons between the
ages of 18 to 30 to one-third of the amount paid to single persons over the age
of 30, unless such persons participate in a workfare program. 4 5 This legislation
has been the subject of the only constitutional challenge to workfare legislation
in Canada. In 1992, a claim that this provision violates sections 7 and 15 of the
41.

42.

This is in large part due to the fact that the terms of the CanadaAssistance Plan (CAP)
exclude such programs from cost-sharing: see P. Evans "From Workfare to the Social
Contract: Implications for Canada of Recent U.S. Welfare Reforms" (1993), 19 Can.
Public Policy 55 at 62. However, the federal government appears to be responding to
the economic and political forces of decentralization by expanding rather than contracting the degree of discretion accorded to the provinces. Moreover, as the federal government limits spending increases under CAP, the provinces may become more inclined to
initiate their own social assistance programs independent of CAP and any policy guidelines contained therein. Federal transfers to Ontario shrank from 50% of social assistance costs in 1989-90 to 28% in 1992-93: Turning Point,supra, note I at 8.
In 1982 Manitoba introduced a plan whereby welfare recipients were compelled to clear
brush and received $4.00 per hour. The program was short-lived as the province soon
determined that brush-cutting was not an important financial priority. In 1982 Alberta
also initiated a program whereby welfare recipients were mandated to work up to 40
hours per week in the homes of disabled elderly persons. Rochman, supra, note 3 at
215 notes that this program never got underway because people were reluctant to hire
the recipients. This illustrates an important point: many members of the public are in
favour of workfare schemes until it is they who are called upon to hire the recipients.
The recipients are thus placed in an untenable situation since they must work in order to
receive welfare yet there are few people who will hire them.

43.

In 1987 Saskatchewan proposed re-enacting this scheme. At that time, a group called
Equal Justice for All denounced it and equated it with slave labour: " 'Slave Labour'
Welfare Plan Denounced", The Globe and Mail (20 April 1987) A4.

44.

Rochman, supra, note 3 at 215.

45.

Loi sur la sLcurit du revenu, L.R.Q. c. S-3.1.1.
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Charterwas rejected by Reeves J. of the Qu6bec Superior Court. 46 Nevertheless,
the legislation received widespread public condemnation and was described by
47
one academic as a tool of social control.
(c) More Subtle Yet Equally Coercive Workfare Requirements
Entitlement to social assistance in Canada is generally dependent on the satisfaction of conditional requirements. For example, all Canadian provinces have,
to varying degrees, incorporated "job search" and "mandatory training" requirements into their social assistance legislation. Although seemingly more subtle
than the "workfare" requirements discussed earlier, much of this difference may
48
be more apparent than real.

In this section, this article shall summarize the "behaviour management"
requirements woven into Ontario's social assistance legislation. These requirements are similar to those found in the welfare systems of the other provinces.
The present tone of the political climate has prompted certain provinces to
reassess the use that can be made of such subtle workfare obligations. In order
to illustrate the nature of this reassessment, the proposed introduction of"opportunity planning" in New Brunswick 49 shall also be reviewed.
(i) Present Obligations: Ontario as a Case-Study
Subtle behaviour manipulation, modification and monitoring requirements dot
the two statutes governing the allocation of social assistance in Ontario: the
Family Benefits Act (FBA) and General Welfare AssistanceAct (GWAA). 50 The
most important obligations placed on employable GWA recipients are the
46.

Gosselin, supra, note 11. This decision shall be discussed in greater depth in section C
of this article.

47.

L. Lamarche, "La nouvelle Loi sur la s6curit6 du revenu au Qu6bec: quelques
r6fl6xions d' actualit" (1991), 21 Revue de droit de l 'Universitj de Sherbrooke 335.

48.

In his recent proposals to introduce measures designed to "reward effort" into Canada's
social assistance network, Human Resources Minister Lloyd Axworthy "...acknowledged there may only be a subtle kind of difference between this kind of encouragement [the "rewarding effort" provisions] and outright coercion ...but...denied that the
government is considering a U.S.-style "workfare" scheme under which people are
stripped of their benefits if they refuse to work": York, supra, note I at Al.

49.

New Brunswick is not alone when it comes to actively rethinking the role social management can play within the welfare context. Alberta, for example, announced in
November 1990 its Supports for Independence Program which requires "self-improvement" plans in exchange for counselling, training and slightly higher benefits: Evans,
supra, note 41 at 63.

50.

R.S.O. 1990, c. F.2 and R.S.O. 1990, c. G.6, as amended. Under the GWAA municipalities provide basic income support to Ontario residents who are in short-term need;
under the FBA the provincial government provides assistance for certain designated
groups who are deemed to be in long-term need.
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mandatory job search requirements. 5 1 In order to remain eligible for benefits
the recipient must "make reasonable efforts to obtain employment". In actual
practice, this can produce a tiresome as well as a fruitless result: a repeated
mechanical job search in areas where there are no job opportunities, in fields in
which the recipient has no desire to work or for jobs incompatible with the
recipient's skills and which may decrease the likelihood of long term employment, a "mandatory mission of futility". 52 Yet if the claimant does not go through
the motions, benefits will be cut. In many cases the job search requirements can
be so onerous that they take the form of workfare in their own right.
There are also learnfare requirements in Ontario. Section 1 of the FBA defines
a dependent child as a person supported by a parent (or someone in locoparentis)
who, if sixteen years of age or over, attends 53 an educational institution and is
making satisfactoryprogress with his orher studies. The parent is thus penalized

for the child's failure to make satisfactory progress in school, a requirement
more onerous than that found in Wisconsin's learnfare scheme. The entire family
thus suffers financially since a child, regardless of academic performance, must
still be fed and clothed, and the money related to these needs must then flow
from the reduced benefits to which the parent is entitled.
(ii)

Future Directions: The New Brunswick Example
Until 1960, the New Brunswick Support of the PoorAct 54 provided that:
Any two overseers for a parish with the consent of a magistrate, shall oblige any
idle, disorderly person, rogue or vagabond who is likely to become chargeable
on the parish where he resides, to labour for any person willing to employ him.

Although this provision has disappeared, New Brunswick's flirtation with
workfare has not. In 1993, the province released CreatingNew Options55 which
proposed the enactment of the N.B.Works Project, of N.B. OPPORTUNITIES,
and of the N.B.JOBS CORPS. Of all provincial initiatives in the area of social

51.

Reg. 537, R.R.O. 1990, s.4.

52.

Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation, Time for Action (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1992), cited in Mosher, supra, note 6 at 490.

53.

In Re Howell and Directorof Family Benefits Branch of Ministry and Community Ser-

vices (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 773 at 777, Griffiths J. held that "...being enrolled in school
was not synonymous with being in attendance." Thus, there is a requirement similar to
that found in Wisconsin, namely that the child "go regularly to" school, else the amount
of welfare benefits accruing to the family shall be reduced.
54.

R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 221, s. 3(1).

55.

CreatingNew Options,supra, note 1.
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assistance reform, the language and structure of these projects is the closest to
American-style workfare schemes.
Predicated on the assumption that social assistance programs must be "active"
rather than "passive", CreatingNew Options makes it clear that recipients must
look for work, accept work when available, and participate in education and
training programs to prepare for work opportunities. In order to place pressure
on those slated to participate but fail to do so or are unsuccessful in integrating
into the job market, the province proposes creating two streams of income
assistance: Temporary Income Replacement to persons with the potential to
re-enter the workforce or participate in "personal development efforts such as
volunteer work, training or employment" and Permanent Income Replacement
provided to those with significant employment barriers. 56 The amount of benefits awarded under the Temporary Income Replacement will take into account
the willingness to participate in work and training opportunities. 57 For those
persons participating in "active programming opportunities" provision is made
for the allotment of a "participation allowance" the covering additional transportation, clothing and other incidental expenses faced by working people. N.B.
Works strongly favours conditioning welfare benefits on participation in the
"active programming" schemes:
The Canada Assistance Plan...does not allow for conditions to be placed on the
allocation of financial assistance related to basic needs. This condition may not
be compatible with wanting to move away from a welfare system to a more positive income replacement vehicle driven by new responsibilities on the part of
the government and the client....In today's economy, individuals must avail
themselves of all opportunities to be fully prepared for today's competitive job
58
market.

N.B. Works also adumbrates the use of indirect as well as direct coercion:
There is a segment of employable clients who are not.. highly motivated. For a
variety of reasons, these individuals are reluctant to leave the security of income
support and refuse opportunities for training and employment when presented.
In [these] situations, the system could be more persuasive. For these
individuals,
59
the temporary nature of income support needs to be reinforced.

56.

Ibid. at 20.

57.

Ibid. at 19.

58.

Ibid. at 18.

59.

Ibid. at 18-19.
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(3) Summary
A survey of the various workfare programs in place in North America reveals
that some have been more successful than others, yet very few have reported
any success at all. One reality that must be addressed is the fact that in many
cases there are simply no jobs for welfare recipients after they have completed
their work or training requirements. In this sense, workfare serves no useful
purpose for the recipient, but just creates pools of conscripted labour. In this
sense, workfare programs do not satisfy the reciprocal obligation so emphasized
by its proponents.
There is evidence that workfare programs might oblige laid-off workers to
perform the same jobs they previously held, yet pay them less than what they
had previously earned. 60 Such a scenario is clearly undesirable both from a
moral standpoint as well as from a practical one, since the participants shall not
learn any new skills. Furthermore, this creates downward pressure on the wages
of existing employees and threatens their job security, especially in the nonunionized public sector, since the state can simply lay-off then re-route the same
persons into the workfare program. Workfare can also increase unemployment
due to threats posed to existing jobs when numbers of non- or low-salaried
persons are available for work.
The American experience reveals another major danger of workfare: the creation
of two strata of poor persons-those receiving public assistance and those who,
once in a workfare job placement, are employed in the private sector.6 1 Given
the fact that there are costs involved in going out to work, workfare participants
may very well be worse off financially than they had been on welfare. 62 In this
regard, workfare could decrease the number of persons on the welfare rolls yet
increase membership in the ranks of the working poor, thereby hiding and

60.

Rochman, supra, note 3 at 211 reports that in New York a group of sanitation workers
was laid off, became eligible for welfare, and within two months were performing the
same tasks as when they were working, except that they were now on workfare.

61.

It is already estimated that, in Ontario, nearly three-fifths of all poor families headed by

working-age adults in 1984 were supported by someone working either full-time or
part-time: Transitions,supra,note 1 at 30.
62.

Child-care, transportation, clothing and the increased need to "eat out" are some examples of this. Moreover, as noted by Smart, supra, note 10 at 235, rents paid for subsidized housing might increase when earned income rises. If the earnings from workfare
programs are considered to be earned income, then the participants might face increased
rental expenses. The New Brunswick government, in Creating New Options, supra,
note 1 at 25, partly addresses this concern by ensuring that the participant in the work
program retain access to the subsidized housing at the prior rent, yet only for a limited
period of time.
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privatizing poverty. This bifurcation of the welfare poor has prompted Joanna
Weinberg to note that:
What is at stake in the structure of a workfare program is not so much the
demise of state-subsidized public assistance programs, but the possibility of
privatization of the responsibility to assist the indigent, through an unregulated pri-

vate market. In this way.. mandatory work requirements resemble ...a radical departure from the central ideology that underlies the public assistance
63 programs of the
twentieth century, that of a public responsibility for the poor.

C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "WORKING FOR WELFARE"
Compulsory work-for-welfare only constitutes a small part of the workfare-style
65
64
schemes presently operating in North America. However, as a Weberian
"ideal-type" of the workfare model, it constitutes a useful point of departure in
terms of defining the types of constitutional rights that less coercive forms of
workfare might violate.
Constitutional scrutiny in Canada operates through the application of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms. The Charteris to be purposively inter67
preted 66 so as to protect the individual from the effects of governmental action.
The Charterhas thus far played a relatively minor role in reshaping the manner
in which the Canadian welfare state is structured. 68 Nevertheless, the rules
governing the welfare state-and the manner in which they are administeredcan menace human dignity and the security of the person in a manner that exhorts
constitutional scrutiny.
(1)

Does Section 7 of the Charter Encompass a Right
to Receive Welfare?

If the receipt of welfare to provide for basic needs is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the Charter,then the government cannot curtail the allocation of

63.

Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 419.

64.

Evans, supra, note 41, cited in Mosher, supra, note 6 at 436.

65.

M. Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences, E. Shils and H. Finch (eds.) (Glencoe,
Ill.: First Press, 1949).

66.

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Morgentaler,Smolling and Scott
(1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.) at 398.

67.

R. v. Big M DrugMart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

68.

M. Jackman, supra, note 14. This should be contrasted with the relatively significant
role the Charter has played in changing the nature of the criminal law and the law of

evidence in Canada.
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such amounts, just as it cannot remove any other Charter right such as the
accused's right to silence, except in accordance with principles of fundamental
justice. There have been scattered attempts to characterize the receipt of social
assistance as a substantive right. These have generally been unsuccessful before
the courts. Nevertheless, the issue is far from settled. Martha Jackman argues
that the refusal to incorporate "welfare rights" within the ambit of s.7 is neither
in accordance with the intentions of the drafters of the Charter nor with
legitimate policy goals.69
A finding that the receipt of welfare is intrinsic to the right to "life, liberty and
security of the person" would have serious implications for the "reciprocal
obligation" approach to the allocation of social assistance. The state would be
prima facie precluded from withdrawing benefits (or, as is generally done in
workfare programs, reducing them below the minimal subsistence level) simply
because a "person in need" fails to behave in the manner prescribed by the state.
The principal reason why courts have been reluctant to place the receipt of social
assistance within the ambit of s.7 stems from the view that welfare is an
"economic or proprietary privilege". Even if the receipt of welfare were an
"economic right", many judges feel that economic rights were simply not
intended to merit Charterprotection. 70 Others, such as McLachlin J.A. [as she
then was], fear the "floodgates effect" of placing economic rights under s.7:
To accept the plaintiff's argument [that a claim for an economic interest which
may enhance a person's ability to acquire aids and amenities to improve the
s. 7] would be to make
person's life, liberty or security of the person, falls under
71
section 7 applicable to virtually all property interests.

69.

Jackman, supra, note 14 at 76. See also: M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare
Rights under the Charter" (1988), 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257. She does not stand alone in
this regard. Johnstone, supra, note 4 at 25, notes that the framers of the Charter were
opposed to the entrenchment of traditional property rights. Many of these concerns
were not rooted in the fear that such an entrenchment would straightjacket future governments into indefinitely providing social assistance, yet, rather, that it would interfere
with the legislative ability to expropriate land, pass zoning by-laws, and redistribute
income through taxation.

70.

I. Morrison, "Security of the Person and the Person in Need: Section Seven of the
Charterand the Right to Welfare" (1988), 4 J.L.& Soc.Pol'y I at 11. This was the position adopted by the Quebec Superior Court in Gosselin, supra,note 13. As pointed out
by Jackman, supra, note 14 at 78, the Gosselin bench did not address the fact that the
reduced social assistance levels were so inadequate that they deprived the plaintiff of
any reasonable prospects of life compatible with the interests and values enshrined in s.
7.

71.

Whitbread v. Walley (1988), 51 D.L.R. (4th) 509 at 521-22 (B.C.C.A.)
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It is respectfully submitted that this argument is flawed. The receipt of welfare
is much more than a simple economic exchange or a claim against the state for
a sum of money. When stripped to its essence, welfare constitutes the only
mechanism by which the poor can eke out a minimal standard of living; it is the
program of last resort for those without sufficient income who have thoroughly
exhausted all other means of support. Terminating social assistance benefits
directly impacts on non-economic interests such as the life, physical security,
self-respect and dignity of the recipient and her family. It also affects the
psychological security and privacy of the recipient: both of these elements
deemed to be protected by s.7.72 Framed in such a perspective, welfare does not
involve economic rights, but the right to "life, liberty, and security of the
person". 73 To this end, although there is an economic transaction: it relates to
one's autonomy as a human being as well as one's ability to survive in contemporary society. As noted by Ian Johnstone:
The important difference between private property and welfare is that the latter
denotes only that which is necessary to sustain a minimum standard of living,
whereas the former refers to all income and wealth. The connection between bodily
well-being and economic security suggests that the fact that not all wealth
is pro74
tected does not preclude the possibility that a basic level of subsistence is.

To this end, the question that should be asked is whether the state would
violate s.7 by denying a person in need the financial resources necessary to
sustain a minimum standard of living, bearing in mind that the interpretation
75
of Charter rights should be "a generous rather than a legalistic one".
Couched in this language, this question has not yet been dealt with by the
Supreme Court,given the pronouncement by the Court in R. v. Irwin Toy that
it does not wish "...to declare that no right with an economic component can
fall within 'security of the person'". 76 In Irwin Toy, the Court went on to
conclude that:
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Morgentaler, supra, note 66 at 401; R. v. Mills (1986), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). In
Collin v. Lussier, [1983] 1 F.C. 218 at 239, Drcary J. of the Federal Court Trial Divi-

sion held that merely increasing a person's anxiety as to his state of health was sufficient to trigger s. 7. It is clear that removing a person from the last remaining income
source upon which that person can depend risks jeopardizing her state of health.
73.

Morrison, supra, note 70 at 28 notes that "...insofar as welfare creates some psychological security about the provision of basic needs...termination of benefits deprives the person in need of this security."
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Johnstone, supra, note 4 at 25 and 26.
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Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 67 at 344.
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[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1004.
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We do not, at this moment choose to pronounce upon whether those economic
rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated
as though they are
77
of the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights.

Through its ratification of numerous international conventions, Canada has
committed itself to the provision of basic social security. For example, Article
25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Canada is a
signatory, provides that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of liveli78
hood in circumstances beyond his control.
Canada's international obligations thus amount to a commitment to use all
means (to the maximum of available resources) to guarantee the right of social
security, to an adequate standard of living, to housing and clothing, and to be
free from hunger. 79 Although international conventions are not legally binding
in Canada, the Supreme Court has held that the international commitments to
which Canada has voluntarily consented help define the scope of Charter
rights. 80 This is particularly the case in the area of promoting universal
human rights. 81 It can thus be argued that Canada's international obligations
place upon the state the duty to provide the necessities of life to all citizens

in need. International obligations, along with the basic tenets of the common
law, also inform the content of fundamental justice. 82 To this end, if it is not

fundamentally just for the state to deny the provision of a minimum income
as required by the Charter, governmental actors shall be hindered in their
ability to curtail the allocation of such an income.

77.

Ibid.
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G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). An expanded version of Article 25 was
incorporated into the 1966 InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Political
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these guarantees.
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authorityfor the interpretationof the Charter.

81.

Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-57.

82.
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On another note, section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982 offers collateral
evidence that the government has committed itself to providing a basic level of

income security:
Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the
provincial governments are committed to:
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities;
(c) providing essential public service of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
Ian Johnstone notes that the combined effect of s.36 and Charters.7 could be
to inject the legislatures with a constitutional responsibility to ensure that basic

needs are met. 83 Nevertheless, it must be recognized that s.36 has received little
in the way of judicial attention; 84 in fact, s.52 has never been used to declare as
null and void any legislation on account of an inconsistency with s.36. To this
end, it is fair to state that this provision is but a policy directive, not a concrete
legal obligation. Nevertheless, even if Johnstone exaggerates the potential effect
of s. 36 on the constitutionalization of welfare rights, it is clear that, at a
minimum, this section serves as evidence that the intent of the drafters of the
Constitution was not to leave the provision of essential public services (of which
social assistance is arguably one element) entirely to the discretion of the
85
legislature.

83.

Johnstone, supra, note 4 at 13.

84.

There has been no litigation on the question whether s. 36 mandates Parliament to provide a minimal level of income assistance to persons in need. Judicial consideration of
s. 36 has, however, touched on several collateral issues. In Winterhaven Stables Limited
v. Attorney Generalof Canada (1986), 71 A.R. 1 (Q.B.), the Court held that s. 36 recognized nothing more than the federal government's authority to assist the provinces in
the provision of essential public services. In Reference Re ConstitutionalQuestionsAct
(1990), 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 at 315, Southin J.A. of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal noted that it is of some importance that the opening words to section 36 indicate
that the section operates in a manner not to alter the legislative authority of Parliament
or of the provincial legislatures. By logical extension, since mandating the provision of
a minimal income might be tantamount to an interference with the legislative authority
of Parliament, an argument could be made that this falls outside the scope of s. 36.
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It is interesting to note that the CanadaAssistance Plan (CAP), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1, the
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In sum, the assertion that there is a constitutional obligation on the state to
provide the necessities of life to "persons in need" is controversial, especially
in light of the recessionary nature of today's economy. However, it is important
to bear in mind Wilson J.'s exhortation in her seminal decision in Re Singh and
Minister of Employment and Immigration:
The guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could be ignored
because it was administratively convenient to do so. No doubt considerable time
and money can be saved by adopting administrative procedures which ignore
the principles of fundamental justice, but such an argument, in my view, misses
86
the point of the exercise.

Given the fact that many of the arguments militating in favour of the constitutionalization of welfare rights have not yet been thoroughly canvassed by the
judiciary, it is important to flesh them out and not to prematurely close debate
on this subject. Should "persons in need" have a constitutional right to welfare,
then it shall be rather difficult for the government to abridge that right through
the implementation of a workfare scheme, unless that scheme comports with the
procedural and substantive elements of fundamental justice. As shall be further
discussed in the next section of this article, the principle of human dignity central
to fundamental justice is unlikely to vindicate any work-for-welfare scheme, but
may validate less coercive reciprocal obligations. To this end, constitutionalizing welfare rights under s. 7 shall likely never mean that persons have an
unfettered claim on the state for social assistance.
(2) Workfare and the Charter
If there is no constitutional right to receive welfare, then an individual's
eligibility for receipt of social assistance can be conditioned upon certain
ongoing requirements over and above the simple demonstration that one is a
"person in need". Participation in a workfare program could conceivably constitute
such a condition. Nevertheless, the government is still bound to establish workfare
conditions that comply with the substantive rights guarantees of the Charterand to
determine non-eligibility for social assistance in accordance with due process
considerations.
In this section, this article shall explore the ways in which a mandatory workfare
program in which persons are required to work for the state in order to receive
the income they would ordinarily have received under social assistance could
violate the Charter.Due to their potentially coercive nature, learnfare programs
shall also be considered in this analysis.

86.

(1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422 at 469 (S.C.C.).
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(a) Section 2(d)
The Charterprovides that:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(d) freedom of association
Section 2(d) has received much judicial attention in so far as it relates to the
ability of individuals to unionize. It has, however, never been addressed in any
litigation on workfare. Moreover, although the section clearly operates to protect
the right to associate, it has only infrequently been called upon to protect the
negative right not to be organized.
The jurisprudence on s.2(d) has discussed the importance to the individual of
her work and employment. Dickson C.J.C., in Reference Re Compulsory Arbitration,held that:
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects of a person's life, providing the
individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory
role in society. A person's employment is an essential component of his or her
sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being. Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are highly significant in shaping the whole compendium of psychological, emotional and physical elements of a person's
87
dignity and self-respect [emphasis mine].

An argument can be made that by obliging someone to participate in a work program
in which there is little, if any, choice as to the type of work to be completed amounts
to a violation of the self-respect and emotional well-being protected by s.2(d).
Courts have been reluctant to give s.2(d) a broad positive reading tantamount
to constitutionally protecting the right of a citizen to work in the field of her
88
choice and not be limited by regulatory arrangements such as licenses.
Nevertheless, this is not the aspect of s.2(d) that is impinged by workfare
schemes. 89 Rather, workfare touches on what is arguably a negative right to be
87.

(1987), 74 N.R. 99 at 194 (S.C.C.). Despite the fact that these comments were made in
dissent, they have subsequently found wide approval on the Court. For example,
lacobucci J., writing for the majority in Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1
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free from coerced association in work relations that categorically fail to respect
the dignity of the unwilling participants. Naturally, if participation in these
programs were genuinely free from any direct or indirect coercion then s.2(d)
would not be infringed.
The principal obstacle in the path of the successful litigation of this point is
found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lavigne v.
O.P.S.E.U.90 This case involved the claim by a member of a bargaining unit
that s.2(d) guaranteed him the right not to be required to be associated with a
union. The Court split on the issue as to whether s. 2(d) enshrined a negative
right not to associate. Wilson J., for the majority, held that the Charterdid not
provide such a right; in fact, s.2(d) was not intended to permit citizens to
extricate themselves from all associations they deem to be undesirable. On the
other hand, La Forest J., with whom Sopinka and Gonthier JJ. concurred,
concluded that s.2(d) did provide a negative right from forced association;
nevertheless, on the particular facts of the Lavigne case he deemed this rights
violation to constitute a reasonable limit under s. 1. The minority submitted that
the essence of freedom of association is the protection of the individual's interest
in self-actualization and fulfilment that can be realized only through combination with others. Since forced association will stifle this interest of the individual
as surely as voluntary association will develop it, freedom from compelled
association is recognized under s.2(d).
Upon closer analysis, even the majority decision in Lavigne does not preclude
a finding that mandatory workfare violates s. 2(d). In her judgment, Wilson J.
was concerned that finding a broad right not to associate would undermine many
of the social units-such as unions and families-that are integral to Canadian
society. Mandatory workfare cannot be equated with these units. Moreover,
unlike with a union, a workfare program does not permit its individual members
the democratic right to vote, nor participate in any decision-making. To this end,
a workfare program is a significantly more coercive organization than a union. 9 1

individuality can claim constitutional entitlement to employment promoting their selfworth and identity. The key difference between such persons and workfare participants
is the degree of compulsion faced by persons subject to workfare.
90.

[1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.

91.

Recipients have no realistic choice whether to participate in workfare, given that failure
to participate shall likely push the recipient below the minimal subsistence level. In
Merry v. Manitoba, [1989] 6 W.W.R. 665 (Man.C.A.), the Court left open the question
as to whether an obligation to be a member of an association could constitute a violation of s. 2(d). Although in all likelihood the obligation imposed on many professionals
to join occupational associations (for example the Law Society of Upper Canada) does
not infringe the Charter,the different nature of workfare could induce a 2(d) violation.
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This fact might be sufficient not only to distinguish Lavigne, yet also to place

workfare within the scope of s.2(d).
(b) Section 7
There are two steps to establishing a breach of s.7: it must firstly be shown that
the state has interfered with the life, liberty and security of a citizen or class

of citizens. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that this interference was
not made in accordance with fundamental justice. Thus, although incarcerating a murderer affects his liberty, if the incarceration arose after a fair trial
then it shall pass constitutional muster since it was made in accordance with

fundamental justice.
(i)

The initial threshold: workfare's impact on the liberty and security
of the person

Workfare arguably involves an intrusion into the liberty of the welfare recipient.
Beneficiaries of social assistance are under state surveillance, obliged to work,

attend classes, and search for employment. Their involvement in the workfare
activity may very well be against their will, yet they remain obliged to participate, on penalty of having their subsistence income eliminated. Germane to this
discussion is the fact that Charterjurisprudence holds that the "liberty" interest

in s. 7 encapsulates more than just freedom from bodily and psychological
restraint. 92 According to Wilson J. in R. v. Jones:
I believe the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty" as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the
individual to develop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to
suit his own character,to make his own choices for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even eccentric-to be in today's parlance "his own
93
person" and accountable as such [emphasis mine].
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Singh, supra, note 86. In Camire v. City of Winnipeg (1989), 57 Man.R. (2d) 192
(C.A.), a "self-admitted binge alcoholic" claimed that a requirement to stay in a "dry"
treatment centre in return for assistance from the City violated his s. 7 rights. The Court
perfunctorily dismissed the allegation. Camire is readily distinguishable from rights
deprivations arising under workfare: (I) Camire voluntarily chose to obtain the assistance; (2) the treatment centre also doubled as a transitional home and Camire needed
supervision for his antisocial behaviour; (3) the assistance from the City was not the
ultimate last resort for Camire, as he was ostensibly eligible for welfare.
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(1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at 582. Although Wilson J. wrote this passage in dissent,
the spirit of her comments have, in more recent years, been adopted by other members
of the Supreme Court. For example, Lamer J., speaking for himself in Reference Re ss.
193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 held at 1177-8
that:
"I am of the view that... s. 7 is implicated when the state restricts
individuals' security of the person by interfering with, or removing from
them, control over their physical or mental integrity. S. 7 is implicated
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In so far as workfare interferes with the individual's freedom of movement as
well as her right to self-determination it can be said to infringe the initial
threshold of s. 7. Participants are denied their right to "plan their own lives to
suit their own characters". Moreover, as discussed in section C(l) of this article,
the Supreme Court has held that "security of the person" includes the right to
94
be free from threats related to one's physical or psychological well-being.

Threatening to remove a subsistence income from a person in need should she,
on a strict liability basis, not be able to fulfil workfare requirements arguably
amounts to a menace to that person's emotional and physical integrity sufficient
to trigger the application of s.7.
(ii) Is the Rights DeprivationConsonant With FundamentalJustice?
Section 7 will permit the right to liberty and security of the person to be deprived

if this deprivation is made in accordance with fundamental justice. The term
"fundamental justice" has a fluid definition and broadly refers to the basic
principles and values underpinning the Canadian legal system. There is both a
95
procedural and substantive aspect to fundamental justice.

when the state, either directly or through its agents, restricts certain
privileges...by using the threat of punishment in cases of
non-compliance. [emphasis mine]"
In Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 67, Dickson C.J.C., while discussing the meaning of the term "freedom" under the Charter,held for the majority at 336-7 that:
"Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or
constraint. If a person is compelled by the state... to a course of action...
which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own
volition and cannot be said to be trulyfree. One of the major purposes
of the Charteris to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint.
Coercion includes...indirectforms of control which determine or limit
alternative courses of conduct available to others. [emphasis mine]"
94.

Singh, supra, note 86; Morgentaler, supra, note 66. In Morgentaler,Dickson C.J.C.
held at 401 that "...state interference with bodily integrity and serious state imposed
psychological stress, at least in the criminal context, constitute a breach of security of
the person." The question remains open whether this statement from Morgentaler
applies to a civil administrative scheme such as workfare. Morrison, supra, note 70 at
24 responds to this point by noting that "...the criminal law is not the only means by
which serious coercive pressure can be brought to bear on the individual and it would
be unreasonable to suggest that criminal sanctions are invariably more severe in consequences than other forms of state action." On another note, Wilson J.(writing for herself) in Morgentalerat 486 concluded that security of the person covers the right of an
individual to make important decisions related to her person independently of state
intervention. A person's choice of where and how to work could clearly fall under such
a right.

95.

Motor Vehicles Reference, supra, note 82 at 487, per Lamer J.
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(iii) Substantive FundamentalJustice
Fundamental justice imposes substantive limits on what the state can do in
implementing legislative schemes. In the celebrated words of Lamer J. in the
Motor Vehicles Reference, governmental initiatives must remain within the
boundaries of "...the elements of a system for the administration of justice which
is founded upon the belief in the dignity and worth of the human person
[emphasis mine]."'96 It is the principle of human dignity that is key to the
constitutionality of working for welfare. Workfare schemes such as those
implemented by Saskatchewan and Manitoba in the mid-1980's (in which
participants were forced to clear brush, clean parks, and build roads) can be said
to violate the principle of human dignity central to fundamental justice. To this
end, s.7 could render unconstitutional certain absolute "work for welfare"
schemes that formerly existed in this country and continue to exist in the United
States. Lucie Lamarche of the Universit6 du Qu6bec takes this analysis one step
further by suggesting that s.7 might even render impermissible workfare pro-

grams that, instead of enhancing employability, oblige recipients to work simply
for the sake of working:
En mati~re de s6curit6 du revenu, il faudrait v6rifier l'effet de l'absence de choix
de comportement des bdndficiaires envers le march6 du travail, celui de la
nature des programmes offerts ainsi que leur objectif r6el, les cons6quences psychologiques et physiques sur les b6n6ficiaires du montant de l'allocation et la
gestion des p6nalit6s. La justice fondamentale ne serait pas addquatement
servie si un programmequi se veut un indicatif /l'employabilitg n 'est en r~alitg
qu 'unefa(on d~guisge de contraindre les bineficiairesatn 'importe quel travail
97
et ultimement, un outil de controle social [emphasis mine].

Nevertheless, given the conceptual fluidity of fundamental justice, a carefully
designed workfare program that minimally infringes the "liberty" or "security"
of the participants might not be found to violate the Charter.Since violations
of s. 7 will rarely, if ever, be upheld under s.1, 9 8 the fundamental justice
component of s. 7 has developed into a semblance of a s. I analysis. 9 9 For this

96.

Ibid. at 503.

97.

Lamarche, supra, note 47 at 361.

98.

Wilson J. (concurring) in R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 1034: "It would be a rare
provision which violate[s] the principles of fundamental justice and could nevertheless
be justified under s. 1". P.W. Hogg, in ConstitutionalLaw of Canada3rd ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992), para. 35.14(c), p. 886, notes that no such infringement has ever been
justified as a s. 1 "reasonable limit".

99.

An illustration of the similarities in determining whether "fundamental justice" or "reasonable limits in a free and democratic society" can operate to validate an impugned
statutory instrument is provided by McLachlin J.'s judgment in R. v. Kindler (1992), 67

(1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy

reason, many of the issues raised in section D of this article (dealing with s. 1) are
pertinent to the discussion of whether workfare satisfies fundamental justice (for
example, the extent to which the scheme is rationally connected to valid policy
objectives while minimally impairing the participants' rights). These issues shall
not be repeated here.
(iv) ProceduralFundamentalJustice
Even if the subject matter of the state intervention is not constitutionally
protected, the Charter still serves to monitor the manner in which the state
intervenes. To this end, once the state has voluntarily created a privilege related
to the well-being of its citizens-such as the allotment of social assistance-it
may be constitutionally constrained in the way it deals with these privileges or
decides to discontinue them.' 0 0
There are a plethora of reasons why persons-fully apprised of the fact that
participation is obligatory-fail to satisfy the requirements set out by workfare
programs. For example, research has revealed that some participants simply
felt the assignment given them was impossible to fulfil for medical reasons,
transportation problems, or child-care difficulties. 10 1 Others noted that their
task was simply unconnected to any long-term employment prospects and
believed they could do better by conducting their own personal job search.
Some recipients are pushed onto welfare dependency because they find themselves at a crisis point in their lives and feel they must resolve their personal
problems before embarking on job training. It is submitted that, should workfare programs be enacted in Canada, the procedural guarantees of s. 7 require
the provision of hearings to determine the reasons for the failure to participate
before any welfare benefit is cut off. 10 2 Moreover, the recipient could be
entitled to written or oral notice1 0 3, discovery of the State's case, rights to
appeall°4, and possibly the assistance of counsel. 10 5 Social assistance legislation

C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.).
100. Singh, supra, note 86, per Wilson J.
101.

"New Research Report on Workfare", supra, note 27 at 333. See also the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254.

102. It is most important to couple this rights protection with public awareness and education so that the claimant can get through the "naming, blaming, claiming" stages once
their benefits are terminated in a manner they perceive to be unfair.
103. In the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lakeside Hutterite Colony v. Hofer,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 at 195, it was held that notice is a "most basic requirement" of fundamental justice, e.g., see s. 13. of the Ontario Family Benefits Act.
104. So that the administrator's decision is reviewable.
105. In Howard v. Stony Mountain, [ 1984] 2 F.C. 642 at 663, the Federal Court held that the
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already provides many of these elements of due process for cases of welfare
termination, and advocates for the poor must ensure that they are equally applied
to termination based on an alleged derogation of workfare responsibilities.
It is settled law that due process and procedural fairness are to be contextually
defined. 106 The number and nature of procedural safeguards sufficient to enable
an administrative decision-making process to comply with fundamental justice
depends on the extent to which the individual subjected to this process can be
prejudiced by its outcome. It is clear that termination or reduction of welfare
benefits can have serious repercussions on the security and physical integrity of
the recipient and her family. To this end, the recipient ought to be entitled to a
fairly high level of procedural protection in order to ensure that the welfare
administrator makes an informed decision in which the risk of error or unfairness
is minimized. This is especially important in cases of termination of social
assistance on account of an alleged failure to participate in a workfare program
since persons cut off for failure to participate will almost always still be in need,
unlike (for example) those cut off due to the fact they may have acquired an
107
additional source of income and are thus no longer as "needy".

right to counsel emerges when a person is in a situation where the consequences of the
decision she faces are severe and she might not have sufficient "aptitude" to understand
and present her case.
106. Singh, supra, note 86; The Queen v. Wholesale Travel, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 at 226,per
Cory J.
107. Although the Chartercan ensure that the decision to terminate benefits complies with
certain procedural safeguards, what it cannot do is ensure that recipients are treated
with respect and dignity. Social assistance recipients already face stigma and stereotype. Michael Ignatieff eloquently addresses this issue in The Needs of Strangers (New
York: Viking Press, 1985):
"The relation between what we need in order to survive and what we
need in order to flourish is...complicated. Giving the poor their pension
and providing them with medical care may be a necessary condition for
their self-respect and their dignity, but it is not a sufficient condition.
Respect and dignity are conferred by ...gestures too much a matter of
human art to be made a consistent matter of administrative routine.
(See also: J.D. Moon, "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State" in
Gutmann (ed.), Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton U. Press, 1988). The
importance of attentiveness and sensitivity in the determination of ineligibility in cases
of unfulfillment of workfare requirements should not be understated. Yet Ignatieff's
words also raise a broader issue. If it is the "manner of giving" that counts, what type of
dignity and self-respect is conveyed when the allocation of social assistance is accompanied by and contingent on mandatory work requirements?
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(c) Section 8
Another issue is the limits the Chartermight impose on the ability of welfare
inspectors to verify whether recipients are conducting themselves in accordance
with the statutory requirements for eligibility. Any search or monitoring procedures
that are unreasonable might amount to violations of s. 8 of the Charter.10 8 One
example of state action that might be susceptible to a s. 8 violation is a program
inaugurated in Qu6bec in 1993 in which inspectors randomly check up on welfare
recipients in their homes in order to determine eligibility. 109
(d) Section 15
Section 15(l) provides that every person has the right to equal benefit and protection
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability. The appropriate test to determine the existence of a s. 15 violation is set
out in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.I10 There are two levels of
analysis. Firstly, the impugned legislation must, directly or indirectly, create a
distinction between persons that, in turn, denies some of those persons equal
benefit of or equal treatment before or under the law. Secondly, the distinction
must involve a prohibited ground of discrimination. There are two types of
prohibited grounds: those enumerated in s.15 and those analogous to these
enumerated grounds. These two grounds frequently cover groups who have
faced historical or structural disadvantage which has rendered them "discrete
1 11
and insular minorities".
In the earlier discussion, this article focused on the ways in which workfare
affected the social assistance recipient in her capacity as an individual. A s. 15
analysis, on the other hand, permits the systemic inequities of workfare to be
laid bare.

108. Section 8 states that: "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search

or seizure".
109. Margaret Philp, "What are Welfare Cheats?", Globe and Mail (30 March 1994). The
Qu6bec government claimed that the inspectors saved the province $80 million in eliminated fraud and errors (10 times the cost of maintaining the inspectors). However, three
Universit6 de Montr6al professors have estimated that the province saved just $10 million as a result of the inspectors' work, while the cost of maintaining the inspections
hovered around $9 million: J. Gow et al., "Choc des valeurs dans l'aide sociale au
Qu6bec? Pertinence et signification des visites A domicile" (U. de Montr6al, 1993)
[unreported].
110. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
111. Ibid. at 183; R. v. Turpin and Siddiqui, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1332.

Constitutional Limits to Workfare and Learnfare

Workfare denies social assistance recipients equal treatment under the law in so far
as it subjects them to behaviour manipulation in order to continue to receive
financial support from the state whereas the state is not equally coercive in
manipulating the lives of other recipients of resources from the state (for example,
the predominantly middle-class recipients of business grants and student bursaries). 112 More graphically, leamfare imposes a burden on the welfare recipient in
an effort to oblige her children to attend school without imposing a similar burden
on the middle class while failing to inquire whether children of the poor demonstrate
a greater propensity for truancy than do children of the middle classes. Non-welfare
parents simply receive a tax-break for every child, not conditioned on any behavioural characteristics such as school attendance. Lucy Williams cites a poor mother:
All my sons skipped school more than twice a month. Did my sons graduate?
Yes. Did they get jobs? Yes. Could I keep them in school by threatening them?
No. I discovered that my sons played hooky at the homes of their friends, who
had employed parents and VCRs. Though their friends skipped school and harbored truants, neither they nor their parents suffer from the learnfare "experiment". Class status, not truancy alone, determined who would be abused by
113
learnfare.

It remains to be seen whether the aforementioned distinctions created by
workfare schemes are discriminatory in nature or effect. At this level of analysis
courts have developed two definitions of discrimination for the purposes of s.
15: "direct" and "adverse impact". An example of direct discrimination would
be a disclaimer on an advertisement for a police officer's position that stated
"no women should apply". Section 15 would be directly touched by such
activity. Yet, what about a disclaimer that read "only persons over 6 feet in height
should apply"? Although, at first blush, such a proviso does not directly affect any
group enumerated in or analogous to those in s. 15, upon closer analysis there is an
indirect discriminatory effect upon women because a much smaller percentage of
women than men are over 6 feet in height. Such a method of analysis is labelled
"adverse impact discrimination". It applies in disregard of the question whether the
employer had any intention to discriminate in the first place. 114

112. Social Planning Council of Metro. Toronto, "Welfare Reform in Ontario: Turning
POINT or Turning BACK?" (Toronto: August 1993) notes that: "When people fear for
their subsistence, they accept onerous and dangerous working conditions. They work
harder, and they work longer. They more readily accept discipline, follow orders, and
submit to humiliation."
113. L. Williams, "The Ideology of Division: Behaviour Modification Welfare Reform Proposals" (1992), 102 Yale L.J. 719 at 735.
114. O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears, [198512 S.C.R. 536 at 547.
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Although in early years of Charter jurisprudence the Supreme Court of
Canada utilized adverse impact analysis in a purposive manner 115 , this
enthusiasm has waned. At present, the Supreme Court is rather taciturn about
applying adverse impact within the context of economic rights. One example
of this is the 1993 decision in Symes v. The Queen. 116 In Symes, the Court
was faced with a claim that the inability of taxpayers to deduct child-care
costs as a business expense amounted to adverse impact sex discrimination, given that women bear the brunt of child-care responsibilities in
Canadian society. lacobucci J., writing for the majority, rejected the
claim. He held that, although he was satisfied that women disproportionately incur the social costs of child-care, the evidence did not
reveal that women disproportionately pay more for child-care. Since the
Income Tax Act 1 7 had nothing to do with the distribution of the social cost
of child-care, merely with the financial cost, it could not be said to be in
violation of the Charter.118 The narrow approach of the Symes decision
elevates the degree of social science evidence that shall have to be presented
in order to convince a court of the existence of adverse impact discrimination. On a related note, it shall be interesting to see how the Supreme Court
applies the Symes reasoning when it considers the Thibaudeau case.11 9 At
the Federal Court of Appeal 120 , Thibaudeau's claim that her s. 15 rights were
violated by the Income Tax Act's inclusion/deduction system of alimony and
child-care payments (s. 56(1)(b)) was successful. The Court found that s.
56(l)(b) offended the rights of single custodialparents to equality under the
law. More germane to this discussion, however, is the fact that the Court
rejected a submission that s. 56(1)(b) amounted to adverse impact sex
discrimination because women tend (1) more frequently to be custodial
parents than men and, (2) disproportionately compose the group receiving
support payments. Hugessen J. held that:
S. 56(1)(b) impacts adversely on more women than men...Since, however, the
legislation must also impact in exactly the same way on custodial fathers,
although in very much smaller numbers, I do not see how it can be said to differentiate or to discriminate on the basis of sex...It cannot be that legislation that

115.

Ibid. See also Action Travail des Femmes v. C N R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114.

116. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.

117. R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 [am. 1970-71-72, c. 63].
118. Symes, supra, note 116 at 764-5.
119. Heard by the Supreme Court on Tuesday, October 4, 1994.
120. [1994] F.C.J. No. 577.
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adversely affects both men and women is discriminatory on
12 1 the grounds of sex
solely because the women in question are more numerous.
If the Supreme Court affirms Hugessen J.'s conclusion, the nature of adverse
impact jurisprudence in Canada shall be significantly altered. It will be more
difficult to categorize groups as adversely affected, since it is extremely rare
than all members of a group claiming adverse impact will be traditionally
disempowered people. Nevertheless, as shall be discussed infra, there are
indications in the Symes judgment that the Supreme Court is not prepared to
take quite such a restrictive view of s.15.
This reluctance to purposively apply adverse impact analysis in the area of
economic rights is not shared by all of highest courts of the provinces. The
decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Re Dartmouth/HalifaxCounty
Regional Housing Authority and Sparks-released after Symes in March
1993-found that a provincial statute setting shorter notice periods in cases
of termination of public housing tenancies than would apply to tenants in
private accommodation violated s. 15.122 The Court found that "public housing tenants" were predominantly composed of people of colour, sole-support
mothers, and elderly and disabled persons. Due to this fact, the unequal
treatment touched upon groups covered by s. 15. The Sparks decision is
interesting since, although the Court used an adverse effects approach, it
unequivocally held that "...it is not necessary [in order to find discrimination
in this case] to show adverse effect discrimination." 123 In other words, the
court held that public housing tenants constituted an analogous group in their
own right, this status flowing from the other sources of disadvantage common to many members of the group. To this end, Sparks constitutes judicial
authority for an argument that workfare participants, due to their socio-economic characteristics, would form a group directly protected by the Charter.
Unfortunately, there are difficulties in applying such an argument: whereas
in Sparks there were two clearly identifiable groups-public and private
tenants-both of which were differently treated by legislation, it is unclear
to whom workfare recipients would be compared in terms of a group suffering differential treatment, unless there were evidence that those persons on
social assistance signalled out for workfare placement disproportionately
tended to be women, people of colour or members of other disadvantaged
groups.

121. Ibid. at paras. 22 and 26.
122. (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 [hereinafter Sparks].
123. Ibid. at 232.
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(i)

Direct Discrimination:Receipt of social assistanceas an analogous
ground of discriminationunder s. 15
An argument can be made that workfare violates s. 15 because it discriminates
directly against persons on social assistance. 124 In order for such an argument
to be successful, it must first be established that receipt of social assistance
constitutes
a ground of discrimination analogous to the grounds enumerated in
s. 15(1). 125

Some courts, such as in Gosselin v. Qudbec, have unequivocally rejected such
a proposition. 126 Others, such as the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sparks have
remained more coy on this issue' 2 7; the British Columbia Supreme Court has
actually held that "...it is clear that persons receiving income assistance constitute a discrete and insular minority within the meaning of section 15".128

124. Or, more generally, against poor persons. It appears more difficult to argue that poverty
is an analogous ground, although some scholars have made compelling arguments in
this regard: see S. Turkington, "A Proposal to Amend the Ontario Human Rights Code:
Recognizing Povertyism" (1993), 9 J.L.& Soc. Pol'y 134. Given the focus of this essay
on workfare programs (in which membership is not based on poverty but one's status as
a welfare recipient) the s. 15 argument shall be limited to receipt of social assistance as a
ground of discrimination.
125. There is some human rights protection available for persons in receipt of social assistance. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-9 precludes
discrimination against persons receiving social assistance in the allotment of accommodation, but the Code excludes "receipt of social assistance" from the precluded grounds
of discrimination in the broader areas of the provision of services and employment.
Both the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 and the Manitoba
Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c.45, s. 9 also view "receipt of public assistance"
and "source of income" as constituting prohibited grounds of discrimination in certain
limited contexts.
126. Supra, note 11.
127. Although in Sparks, supra, note 122 at 232 the Court of Appeal stated that the tenants
were discriminated in part due to their "income", the Court did not rely solely on
"income" as a ground for discrimination, viewing it as merely one factor, when coupled
with gender, race and age, that allowed "public housing tenants" to constitute an analogous group under s. 15.
128. FederatedAnti-Poverty Groups v. B.C. (A.G.) (1991), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 325 (B.C.S.C.).
Ever since the Andrews decision, finding that a group constitutes a "discrete and insular
minority" is strong evidence that such a group is entitled to the protection of s. 15. The
Tax Court of Canada has found that poverty can be a personal characteristic for the purposes of inclusion as an unenumerated ground of discrimination under s.15: Schaff v.
Canada (August 5, 1993), Action No. 92-1054 (IT) (T.C.C.) [unreported]. It was held
at 16 that a poor, single, female divorced parent was part of a discrete and insular
minority and that poverty was a "personal characteristic that can form the basis of discrimination." Schaff also found that there is some room for economic rights within the
meaning of "security of the person" in s.7. This case involved the unsuccessful claim by
a custodial parent that the taxation of child support payments violated both sections 7
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Nevertheless, given the splintered state of the jurisprudence, it might be more
illuminating to address some of the arguments in favour of placing persons in
receipt of social assistance under the protective umbrella of s. 15.
It is clear that persons receiving social assistance lack political influence. This
lack of influence is exacerbated by the fact that they do not stand independently
from the state, but are bound by necessity to lean against the state for survival.
It is this element of material dependence that places social assistance recipients
in a particularly vulnerable position. Ian Johnstone observes that "...manipulation of the power to withhold the means to basic sustenance poses special
dangers for personal integrity". 129 If the goal of s.15 is to remedy or prevent
discrimination against such vulnerable groups, then including social assistance
recipients among the protected classes of persons can help ensure that the
equality provision of the Charteris given full effect.
Welfare recipients are also the victims of stereotype and stigma, as is evidenced
in the following passage from Lawrence Mead:
The basic fact about [welfare recipients] is that they live under the authority...of
the welfare department, and they need to take direction from that authority
because they themselves don't have it as clearly in mind as many other people
as to what they are supposed to do.. .But the recipients are different enough from
the rest so that they in fact accept [work requirements] and it fills a need they
have. 130

This stereotype operates even though much of the responsibility for being on
social assistance must be attributed not to the recipient, yet to the structure of
capitalist society. In a sense, those benefitting from the capitalist system justify
it on the basis that the "have-nots" who "fall through the cracks" do so on
account of their own personal shortcomings, and not because the system itself
is replete with cracks through which some persons shall fall regardless of any
lack of personal enterprise or motivation. As Sheilagh Turkington notes,
"...incorrect assumptions about poverty [are translated] into assumptions about
the people who are poor."' 13 1 In fact, much of the rhetoric supporting the
implementation of workfare schemes is based on the unproven assumption that
social assistance recipients are lazy, unmotivated and in need of a "shock to their

and 15.
129. Johnstone, supra, note 4 at 27. In favour of this proposition, Johnstone cites Charles
Reich: "A power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."
130. Mead, supra, note 17 at 36-41, 99.
131. Turkington, supra, note 124 at 141.
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system" in order to become productive members of society. In terms of learnfare,
there is a false assumption that teenagers in poor families are more likely to be
truant than teenagers from middle-class families; 132 another misconception that
spins from this assumption is that parents on social assistance somehow do not
want the best for their children.
Many of the grounds enumerated in s. 15 involve immutable characteristics. For
example, it is difficult to change one's gender and impossible to change one's
race or age. 133 Similarly, an argument can be made that poverty is an immutable
trait. Marc Gerber notes, in the American context, that surveys conclude that
"...the odds for moving from the bottom 20% in income distribution to the top
40% are 1 in 10." 134 Another study cited by Gerber found that of twenty
year-olds starting in the bottom quintile, three-quarters were there thirty years
later and virtually none had moved to the top. 135 Given this empirical research,
Gerber concludes that wealth appears to be a quasi-immutable trait. As such, he
sees no reason why it should not constitute a prohibited ground of discrimination.
Gerber's analysis offers an interesting perspective as to why poverty should be
treated as an analogous ground under s. 15. Nevertheless, there are certain
shortcomings to his analysis. The principal weakness is the focus on the
necessity of proving immutability on an individual level. Even though many
prohibited grounds of discrimination are in fact "immutable", why should
"immutability" be required in order for a characteristic to be deemed to be an
analogous ground under s. 15(1)? Such an approach sets a finite limit to the
number of prohibited grounds, and fails to recognize that conditions such as
illiteracy, drug dependency and alcoholism (none of which are necessarily
immutable traits) are often used to justify treating people differently in a prima
facie discriminatory manner.

132. Weinberg, supra, note 5; Williams, supra, note 113 at 733 found that, in the United
States, children of AFDC families miss 3 more days of school per year than children of
non-AFDC families.
133. The term "disability" has also traditionally been interpreted as covering those physical
and mental impairments over which the individual has no control; the popularity of this
approach is, however, on the wane.
134. Marc Stuart Gerber, "Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and Learnfare: Wealth
Classifications Revisited" (1993), 81 Georgetown L. J. 2141 at 2161. Gerber relies on
U.S. socio-economic data which may not reflect social mobility in Canada. Nevertheless, despite this important limitation, Gerber's findings and their application to human
rights law still remain instructive.
135. Ibid.
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However, if the "immutability" approach is to be followed, one way to make it
more sensible in the workfare context is to view unemployment not as an
immutable characteristic of the unemployed person, but rather of capitalist
society. Such a perspective can encourage broader reforms to the Canadian
political economy geared towards alleviating poverty not only on an individual
basis, yet also on a systemic level.
A finding that social assistance recipients are entitled to s. 15 protection has
broad ramifications that go beyond obligatory workfare programs. For example,
a non-coercive workfare scheme (one in which participation is purely voluntary
and unconnected to the continued receipt of benefits) could be precluded from
being exempted from workplace regulations that apply to all employees in the
labour market. In other words, the state would be mandated to ensure that
persons in such programs benefit from the same occupational health and safety
rules, human rights guarantees, and minimum wage requirements than all other
employees. Constitutional litigation in this area could also affect the environment in which and conditions under which other groups of quasi-conscripted
136
labour (prisoners and psychiatric patients) are made to work.
(ii) DisparateImpactAnalysis
Even if the claim that receipt of social assistance constitutes an analogous
ground under s. 15 fails, workfare can still be challenged on the basis of an
adverse impact analysis. Key to the applicability of adverse impact to the
workfare context is recognition of the fact that:
The poor are not a random selection of individuals who have fallen on hard times,
but rather tend to belong to particularly vulnerable groups or groups traditionally
disadvantaged in other ways-sole support single parents (usually women), the
elderly (especially elderly women), the physically and mentally disabled, Native
37
people and, most disturbingly, a high proportion of dependent children. 1

Although the preceding passage reveals that many traditionally disadvantaged
groups would be affected by workfare, this article shall not consider the potential
claims of all of these groups.138 Instead, attention shall only be focused on two
groups.

136. For a discussion of the constitutionality of a provincial regulation exempting employers

from paying patients in psychiatric institutions less than the minimum wage in
exchange for their work, consult Fenton v. B. C. (Forensic PsychiatricServices Commission) (1989), 29 C.C.E.L. 168 (B.C.S.C.), reversed on appeal (1991), 82 D.L.R.(4th)
27 (B.C.C.A.).

137. Morrison, supra, note 70 at 29.
138. Such a comprehensive review is outside the scope of this article.
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(iii) Effects on single mothers
As discussed earlier, the Symes case appears to make it more difficult for
women-despite their status as an enumerated group-to claim that, based on
an adverse impact analysis, the state engaged in a pattern of discrimination in
the allotment of economic privileges. Nevertheless, the door is far from closed.
In his decision lacobucci J. was careful to point out that:
In another case, a different subgroup of women with a different evidentiary focus ... might well be able to demonstrate the adverse effects
required by s. 15(1). For example, I note that no particular effort was
made in this case to establish the circumstances of single mothers. If, for
example, it could be established that women are more likely than men to
head single parent households, one can imagine that an adverse-effects
analysis involving single mothers might well take a different course,
since the child-care expenses
would thus disproportionatelyfall upon
39
women [emphasis mine].1

It is along these lines that the most fruitful constitutional challenges of workfare
might operate. In the United States, it is AFDC recipients, the majority of which
are single mothers, that are most vigorously singled out for workfare programs. 140 A similar situation is found in Canada. 141 For example, in Ontario the
Transitions Report recommended that sole-support parents (as well as adolescent mothers and victims of family violence 142) be specifically targeted for
"opportunity planning".143 New Brunswick's N.B. Works Program is similar in
this regard. When coupled with the passage from Symes above, the following

139. Symes, supra, note 116 at 766-7.
140. Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 421 and 439. Although it seems plausible that people of colour and persons of the First Nations also compose a disproportionately large part of
social assistance recipients (and that it might be possible to allege a s.15 violation on
account of race), this issue merits independent attention and is too important to be compressed within the limits of this article.
141.

Smart, supra, note 10 at 226 notes that 30% of social assistance recipients in Ontario
are sole support parents, and 85% of these are women. Sole support mothers and their
children together constitute about 37% of all social assistance beneficiaries. As to the
ability of such numbers to trigger an adverse impact sex discrimination finding, it is
useful to once again turn to the decision of the Iacobucci J. in Symes, supra, note 116 at
767: "As...my comments... relating to single mothers imply, if I were convinced that [s.
63] has an adverse effect upon some women...I would not be concerned if the effect was
not felt by all women. That an adverse effect felt by a subgroup of women can still constitute sex-based discriminationappears clear to me from a considerationof past decisions [emphasis mine]. "

142. Overwhelmingly women.
143. TransitionsReport, supra, note I at Recommendation 75.
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citation from the Sparks decision offers persuasive judicial authority that single
mothers should benefit from and merit the protection of s. 15:
Single mothers are now known to be the group in society most likely to experience poverty in the extreme. It is by virtue of being a single mother that this
poverty is likely to affect the members of this group. This is no less a144
personal
characteristic of such individuals than non-citizenship was in Andrews.

Despite their disproportionate numbers in workfare programs, it is unfortunate
that the specific needs of single mothers often remain unaddressed. 145 One
example is the provision of childcare. It is clear that, without the existence of
state-sponsored childcare, a single poor mother will find it more difficult to
regularly attend work or training programs than will recipients without children. 146 If the workfare scheme is punitive in nature-punishing the delinquent
participant with reduced or eliminated social assistance benefits-then this
scheme shall have a discriminatory impact on single mothers and women in
general. To this end, workfare schemes (such as GAIN or N.B. Works) that
incorporate free child-care shall have a greater chance of surviving the scrutiny
of s.15.
More generally, despite the fact that women are overrepresented in the ranks of
workfare participants, there is evidence that workfare programs have favoured
men in the allocation of scarce jobs. 147 There is also evidence that training and
job searches orient women to jobs in traditional "women's work" 148 "pink
144. Sparks, supra, note 122 at 233-4.
145. Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 440.
146. Another concern is that women also take a disproportionately large responsibility of
caring for infirm parents, this care-giving increasing in importance as the "baby boomers" progressively age.
147. Rochman, supra, note 3 at 214, in her survey of workfare programs in the United
States, found that "...women were less likely to be placed in jobs." At 208, she notes
that Congress overtly indicated that priority should be given to unemployed men in
terms of participation in training and jobs. American evidence is of limited use in Canada, yet the demographics of social assistance recipients in both countries are sufficiently similar to justify the conclusion that, were U.S-style workfare schemes to be
introduced in Canada, many of the effects on the participants (in this case, the women),
would be analogous. In the least, a comparative analysis with the U.S. shows what
workfare designers in Canada should not do. Perhaps if many of the shortcomings common to the U.S. programs were avoided, workfare initiatives in Canada might not only
be more effective, yet also more respectful of constitutional exigencies.
148. Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 441 concludes that most of the jobs provided to women as
part of the obligatory workfare "...seem to be clustered in traditional areas of 'women's
work', for example as caretakers for children and the elderly in day care centres and
nursing homes, food service work, and or cleaning servces."
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collar" sectors in which wages and benefits are lower than for traditional "men's
work". 149 In this sense, workfare exacerbates traditional market inequalities and
contributes to the feminization of poverty:
While [workfare] programs increasingly tend to draw female recipients of welfare programs into the mandatory work net.. .rather than enabling women to
enter the workplace with a full earnings potential, these programs are often
structured so as to tie women to low-end jobs, at low pay, and often of temporary duration. 150

Learnfare triggers similar constitutional issues. It could also have a discriminatory impact on women since they, head the majority of sole support parent
families on social assistance and bear the financial and emotional costs commensurate with such responsibilities. Single mothers shall thus bear a disproportionate brunt of state sanction in terms of termination of welfare benefits
even though, as discussed infra, the actual ability of these parents to ensure that
their child attends school might be minimal.
(iv) Effects on persons with a disability
In general, the workfare programs discussed earlier will exempt persons with
physical or mental disabilities on the assumption that such persons cannot be
"expected" to work. They are thus more "deserving" of welfare payments and
do not have to fulfil a reciprocal obligation in order to benefit from society's
charitable spirit. Such blanket exemptions of disabled persons from all training
or work schemes touch on s. 15 in two regards.
Firstly, assuming arguendo that the training opportunities genuinely facilitate
integration into the labour market, then an inability to participate in such
activities can exacerbate the pre-existing disadvantage faced by recipients with
disabilities. To this end, constitutionally permissible workfare programs would
reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities, regardless of whether participation in such programs is voluntary or not.
In Ontario the Vocational Rehabilitation Services program 15 1 (VRS) is geared
to the provision of "opportunity planning" to persons with disabilities. In order
to participate in this program, individuals must be deemed to be "vocationally
handicapped" as well as display "an apparent potential" for employment.

149. Rochman, supra, note 3 at 219 found that the majority of women in provincial apprenticeship programs sponsored under workfare schemes attended hairdressing or cooking
classes.
150. Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 440.
151. Vocational RehabilitationServices Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. V-5.
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Although the existence of a VRS program could help a workfare scheme survive
a s. 15 challenge based on discrimination regarding a physical or mental disability, the fact that persons with disabilities are placed in a separate stream and not
with the bulk of recipients might still constitute a deprivation of the claimant's
right to equal benefit of the law. In order to curb this possibility, these programs
must offer similar levels of compensation and opportunities to disabled participants than those offered to their able-bodied peers.
Secondly, assuming the workfare programs were unhelpful, society could still
perceive the participants as having discharged their "reciprocal obligation" to
society and hence more "deserving" of the receipt of benefits or, more
importantly, of legitimate employment so as to "get off' the welfare rolls. The
non-participants, although spared the obligation to work for welfare, are still
disadvantaged due to society's impression that they are undeserving for want of
participation. Workfare, by treating individual welfare recipients unequally due
to personal characteristics, can open the door to a violation of the equality
guarantee contained in the Charter.

D.

JUSTIFYING "WORKING" AND "LEARNING" FOR WELFARE
UNDER SECTION 1
Section 1 allows Charterviolations to be upheld if these violations are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society. Any discussion as to whether
a workfare scheme amounts to a reasonable limit shall largely depend on the
details of that particular scheme. The determination of whether a rights infringement amounts to a reasonable limit is a highly contextual process. 152 To this
end, given the fact that this article only discusses workfare schemes in the
abstract, the most that it can contribute to the s.1 analysis is a broad survey
of the extent to which workfare programs might be able to attain their policy
goals. In this regard, attention shall be directed to how workfare programs
could be structured so as to minimally impair whatever Charterrights they
may violate.
The test to establish whether a statutory provision constitutes a "reasonable
limit" was first promulgated by former Chief Justice Dickson in The Queen v.
Oakes. 153 A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two
conditions are met. Firstly, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and
substantial. Secondly, the means chosen to attain this legislative end must be
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. In
152. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, per Wilson J.
153. Supra, note 80.
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order to satisfy the second requirement, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the
rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2)
the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charterguarantee; and (3)
there must be a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its
objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the
abridgement of the right.
(1) Workfare
Michael Wiseman suggests several policy goals common to workfare programs. 154 These include: (1) workfare makes the allocation of welfare more
equitable; (2) work requirements reduce the cost of welfare; (3) workfare
enhances skills, contributes to employability and facilitates the integration of
persons into the working world. In order to deal with the more interesting policy
issues that emerge from the second tier of the Oakes test, this article shall make
the assumption that the goals of workfare are pressing and substantial.
(a)
(i)

Rational Connection
Enhancing Skills and Increasing Employability

Perhaps the principle goal of workfare is the integration of persons on social
assistance into the labour market. There is a belief that workfare may be
especially effective in providing job experience to those with no work history
or who have been out of the workforce for long periods of time. 155 Nevertheless,
upon closer scrutiny, workfare does not appear to satisfy the second branch of
the Oakes test since it is not rationally connected to the attainment of this goal.
Empirical research indicates that the work performed in the workfare programs
15 6
is only tenuously linked to what is available in the employment market.
In this sense, the work experience garnered through participation in workfare
has little inherent market value. Unless the training and apprenticeship experience that is offered directly prepares people for suitable jobs available in the
labour market, it will be difficult to demonstrate that obliging welfare recipients
to participate is rationally connected to a policy goal of integrating them into
the working world.

154. M. Wiseman, "Workfare and Welfare Reform", in H. Rodgers, Jr., ed., Beyond Welfare
(New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1988).
155. It is unclear whether this policy objective could be conceived of as a pressing and substantial goal. Weinberg, supra, note 5 at 429, found that half of all AFDC recipients
move off the rolls, usually to a job, within two years regardless of participation in any
program.
156. Ibid. at 438.
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There is widespread consensus on the point that the most important factor in
re-immersing persons into the workforce is nothing less than the creation of
legitimate employment opportunities. By focusing only on the labour side of the
job market, workfare shall, at most, merely increase the skills level of the
unemployed, not provide them with employment. A more effective expenditure
of resources that would be less violative of Charter rights would involve
incentives given to private employers so as to stimulate the creation of suitable
future-oriented employment.
Given the fact that there must be personal motivation in order to be competitive
in the job market (and given that this cannot be artificially created through
coerced workfare participation), it is unclear how workfare can attain its
long-term policy goals of reducing dependence on social assistance. At most, it
will privatize and hide some of this poverty, with any resultant reduction of the
burden on the taxpayer being but illusory.
Prior American as well as Canadian experiences also reveals that workfare
schemes perpetuate gender inequality in the workplace. If an avowed goal of
many of these schemes is to lift single mothers out of poverty, it is unclear how
these programs can attain this result since they generally fail to address the needs
of single mothers-the section 15 violation is thus left unanswered.
(ii) Reducing Costs
Workfare proponents argue that workfare will reduce costs to the social assistance system in two ways: (1) by offsetting the cost of making payments with
the completion of compulsory work; and (2) by reducing the number of persons
on the welfare rolls. At the outset, it should be noted that, the economic value
of the work completed by workfare recipients is low since, due to the meagre
salaries, the participants have little consumption power. Moreover, the New
York experience discussed in section B(2)(a) of this article indicates that making
jobs available for workfare recipients often means taking away jobs from
already employed persons who, due to their higher salaries, prompt more
investment in local economies.
Secondly, experience reveals that, although workfare may get some people off
welfare, it is ineffective in combatting poverty. The recipient whose benefits are
terminated is no longer technically registered on the rolls, yet remains equally
in need. Little is gained by cutting someone off welfare because she failed to
comply with the workfare scheme, even if this non-compliance is deliberate.
The small amount of money saved by cutting off recalcitrant recipients must be
weighed against the costs to society in terms of the delinquency and dislocation
that arguably stem from increased poverty.
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On a final note, it must be noted that workfare programs are often expensive to
administer and mandate extensive surveillance activities on the part of the state.
For this reason, the number of places allotted to workfare programs is often
limited. Thus, despite their high cost, workfare programs can, at most, only help
a small fraction of welfare recipients prepare for the labour market. Programs
could become oversubscribed because welfare recipients will feel they have to
join in order to avoid having their benefits reduced. In the absence of any clear
guidelines, acceptance into the program shall become discretionary and result
in the internal stratification of the class of persons receiving social assistance.
(iii) Making the Provision of Welfare More Equitable
Wiseman notes that one cardinal principle of workfare proposals is that persons
who work should be better off than those who are on welfare. Nevertheless,
given the fact that many workfare programs do not factor in the extra costs of
"going to work" (nor the loss of medical benefits and subsidized housing that
may come with employment), these programs may create a situation in which
persons in workfare may be worse off than they would be on welfare. To this
end, programs such as N.B. Works that address these considerations might have
a greater chance of being upheld under s. 1.
The failure of a comprehensive response such as GAIN indicates the extent to
which workfare must lead to jobs that pay decent wages in order for the recipient
to move off the welfare rolls. The "decency" of a wage must be evaluated in
terms of its ability to allow the claimant to pay child-care and other work
related expenses and still take home at least what would have been received
from welfare. 157 If this is not the case, persons will be worse off after
completing the program; they will then rationally quit work and drift back
on welfare, and participation in the program will not have yielded any
practical advantages.
(b) Minimal Impairment
Even if workfare were rationally connected to its policy goals, it seems likely
to fail the "minimal impairment" branch of the Oakes test principally due to the
fact that participation is mandatory, with (from a welfare recipient's point of
view) severe punitive sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Given this
observation, an incentive-based bonus system might better help welfare recipients integrate themselves into the labour market while minimally impairing their
Charter rights. 158 This system could simply compensate recipients for their
157.

Smart, supra, note 10; M. Philp, "Welfare System Shatters Dreams of a Better Life",
Globe and Mail (21 January 1994) Al.

158. York, supra, note 1 at Al. An incentive-based "bonus" system is also encouraged by
Rochman, supra, note 3 at 226. The Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legis-
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participation in certain programs. The compensation would amount to an
increase in the benefits received under social assistance legislation above the
159
adequate provision for basic needs.
It is interesting to note that "bonus-style" voluntary programs adopted by some
American states experienced higher success rates and lower costs than programs
such as WIN and GAIN that contain mandatory participation requirements. For
example, a Massachusetts program 160 featuring job training, education, placement in wage employment, daycare 161 and transitional medical services helped
86% of the voluntary participants placed into jobs to remain employed in the
62
same job one year after leaving the program. 1
It is important that the training programs emphasize the teaching of practical
knowledge 163 matched to jobs that are not only available, but that offer a decent
wage and the potential for permanent employment. Without preparing persons
for jobs that are actually in demand, training programs will just perpetuate the
number of welfare recipients and workfare participants. Moreover, workplace
centered literacy must be stressed for those recipients most in need of extensive

lation, cited in Mosher, supra, note 6 at 479, disapproves of the use of coercive measures as part of opportunity planning. The Group concludes at 491 that: "People who
are receiving social assistance have already been sanctioned by society. Society has
consigned many of these people to life on the margins of the community, in poor housing in poor districts. The educational system has failed many of them; the percentage of
recipients who have not completed high school is much higher than the general population. Further sanctions are not appropriate."
159. This position is adumbrated by Parkdale Community Legal Services, Submission to the
Social Assistance Review Committee (1986) [unpublished].
160. Called the Education and Training Program (ET).
161. For a discussion of the extent to which the cost of daycare reduces the amount of earnings from state-sponsored employment in Ontario, consult Smart, supra, note 10 at 234
and 241. In 1990, Smart estimated that the monthly cost of full-time care for one infant
or pre-school child was likely to range from $400.00 to $700.00 per month; for two
such children, costs would range from $600.00 to $1400.00 per month. These expenses
must be contrasted with the actual size of welfare payments in Ontario: $650.00
monthly for a single employable adult; $1355.00 for a single parent with two children
under 12.
162. Rochman, supra, note 3 at 209. The average starting salary of these jobs was $12,000,
notably better than the $8,000 ceiling on AFDC payments. 82% of the persons placed
in jobs were women.
163. There is debate related to the issue of whether education is necessarily the best link to
work. Many recipients feel uncomfortable in a class-room environment in which they
may have faced difficulty in the past. It is especially problematic to tie continued
receipt of benefits to attendance in educational programs that are only slightly geared to
the communication of concrete skills applicable in the existing labour market.
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training.1 64 In the 1990's, the few new jobs that are being created are predominantly found in the service and information-based sectors. 165 These often
necessitate a higher degree of literacy than work in other employment sectors. 166
Without allowing participants to voluntarily choose from a broad range of
options, workfare programs become punitive in nature. It is clearly counterproductive to threaten recipients with reduction or loss of benefits should they fail
to participate in a program that does not lead to a useful end. 167 These considerations are especially relevant in the present economic context, where there is
a lack of jobs in many areas in which traditional schemes have focused their
interest (routinized or manual labour). Given the fact that the forces of a below
full employment economy inevitably result in many persons being without
work, obliging all recipients to "earn" their benefits through work and training
appears to be misguided. A voluntary approach, on the other had, tends to be
more equitable, effective, and respectful of the participants' Charterrights. The
emphasis on voluntary participation redefines the goal of workfare: instead of
satisfying a reciprocal obligation, such programs can help recipients help
themselves while preserving their autonomy.

(2) Learnfare
In general the policy goals of learnfare schemes are to prevent teenagers from
dropping out of school and encourage them to pursue their studies with diligence. 168 Research reveals that, in the U.S., children of AFDC dependent
families only miss on average 3 more days of school per year than children of
non-AFDC families. 169 It thus seems that learnfare is based on an inaccurate

164. Over 50% of social assistance recipients in Ontario are functionally illiterate: C. Swan,
"Why Millions of Canadians Can't Read This Article" (1990), 14:3 Perception 8 at 9.
165. Economic Council of Canada, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services, 1990).
166. "The introduction of new technologies in the workplace can render an individual
'illiterate' overnight. In effect, the level of proficiency needed to be 'literate' in the
1990's is higher than that required in the 1940's. The fact that society has raised its
requirements for literacy means that many young people today, although more literate
than their parents and grandparents, are less able to shoulder the heightened demands
placed on them": M.A. Drumbl, "Illiteracy, Disempowerment and Injustice: How the
OntarioHuman Rights Code Can Protect Persons With Low Literacy Skills" (1993), 4
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 107 at 111.
167. As noted by Rochman, supra, note 3 at 226: "If training programs are effective and perceived as effective in helping persons move into the workforce, there is every indication
that people will volunteer to enter them."
168. Gerber, supra, note 134 at 2143.
169. Williams, supra, note 113 at 733, citing Wisconsin LearnfareProgram:Hearing Before
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assumption of the patterns of school attendance of children whose parent(s) are
dependent on social assistance. Thus, it does not appear to be a policy goal of
pressing and substantial importance to oblige these children to be monitored by
70
workfare in order to secure their attendance in school.1
Even if this amounts to a pressing and substantial goal, it is unclear whether
learnfare shall attain this goal in any manner, let alone if it is rationally connected
thereto. Lucy Williams, notes that "...learnfare makes a series of remarkable
assumptions about the maturity and sophistication of teenagers, especially given
behaviour problems already evident through truancy."' 17 1 Teenagers unwilling
to attend school for reasons involving violence in school, drug abuse, or the need
to babysit will be unlikely to change their behaviour merely to spare the family
a portion of their monthly welfare cheque. It is also clear that parents exert little
control over the lives of their teenage children and will thus be unable to coerce
them to mechanically attend school on a regular basis. Even if a mother can
ensure that a teen gets to school, there is no way for her to ensure that he stays
there all day. Yet it shall be the parent who is punished. On a final note, learnfare
also assumes that teens will not be tempted to use their ability to trigger a
sanction as a means to threaten and control their parent(s). 172 Lucy Williams
points out that:
Leamfare [in fact] may lead to increased family stress and create a parental
incentive to kick a child out of the home ifshe or he fails to attend school,173
thus

subverting the program's stated goal of furthering education for poor teens.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR LESS COERCIVE FORMS OF "WORKFARE"
AND "LEARNFARE"
An argument can be made that obliging a person to engage in a mandatory job
search activity under threat of the curtailment of welfare benefits could conceiv74
ably infringe that person's s.7 right to liberty and security of the person.1 If
the Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Committee on
Finance, 101st Congr., 2d Sess. 50 (1990).
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid. at731.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid.
174.

It is important to look at the effects of legislation when assessing itsconstitutionality.
From such an optic, is there not but a slim difference between coerced work and having

to search and accept a labour market job of any kind in order to maintain one's interim
eligibility for welfare benefits?
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these job search requirements are to take place in an economic conjecture in
which there are simply no jobs or oblige the recipient to look for and accept
work in totally unrelated fields in which he is simply "physically capable" of
working, an argument can be made that the substantive element of fundamental
justice would remain unsatisfied or s.2(d) violated.
A 1991 report by the Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation
discusses the extent to which job search requirements not only infringe certain
principles key to the tenets of the Canadian legal system, but are also so
unconnected to their policy goals that it would be problematic to uphold such
requirements under the Oakes test. Job search requirements will not alleviate
long-term unemployment. They merely creates pools of underemployed persons, surely not in line with the policy goals of social welfare legislation. The
Advisory Group concludes that:
The regulation that says that a person can be required to take any job of which
he or she is physically capable represents thinking of a bygone era when the
bulk of the workforce was made up of unskilled labourers. What it means in
today's environment is that a fully qualified tradesperson who cannot find work
in his or her trade this month may be cut off assistance unless the individual
75
agrees to take any job immediately. 1
The earlier discussion demonstrated that learnfare schemes which reduce or
eliminate a recipient's grant should her children neither attend nor make satisfactory progress in school are constitutionally suspect, especially regarding
s. 15. Yet what about the second variant of learnfare-where the recipient is
obliged to attend training sessions as a condition of continued eligibility? There
are similar infringements of the s. 7 "liberty" interest as those occasioned by
workfare. Moreover, since mandatory training often takes place in the workplace
(perhaps in the form of an apprenticeship), the differences between learnfare
and workfare can sometimes become illusory. 176 To this end, the safest way to
ensure the legitimacy of such programs is to make participation voluntary, with
the program logically connected to the teaching of skills demanded by the
market. The programs should also be linked with student bursary/loan plans;
they should also offer instruction in English as well as other languages, thereby

175. Supra, note 52.

176. Rochman, supra, note 3 at 207 concludes that "...as a practical reality, many training
programs require placement in a worksite." To this end, mandatory training often cannot be disaggregated from compulsory work. Since a failure to participate in the program will result in a curtailment of benefits, the recipient is defacto obliged to fulfil the
apprenticeship component of the job training.
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increasing accessibility for recently arrived immigrants, many of whom are
dependent upon social assistance.
In sum, the ability of pseudo-workfare programs to survive constitutional
scrutiny shall depend on their ability to provide a constructive opportunity for
self-development while minimally impairing the Charter rights of welfare
recipients. On this latter point, issues such as the degree of choice regarding
participation, the ability to freely pick a program that suits one's needs, the
amount of pay, the provision of child-care, the absence of a penalty for noncompliance, as well as the procedures by which non-compliance is determined
shall all impact heavily on the extent to which the program can straddle the
fine-line between valid legislative initiative and unconstitutional state intrusion.
It is important for "opportunity planning" to be predicated on the assumption
that most recipients who are able to work want to work and will work in fields
suitable to them, not on Lawrence Mead's belief that the poor are passive and
listless, requiring the electric shock therapy of workfare in order to prod them
into labour market participation.
CONCLUSION
The Charter requirements discussed in this essay should not be perceived as
obstacles to public policy reform, but rather as guidelines that can help Canada
revamp its social assistance network in as equitable and coherent a manner as
possible.
Patricia Evans remarks that workfare works best as an ideology. 177 It ensures
that, symbolically, recipients are not getting a "free ride" but must earn their
benefits through demonstrations of responsible behaviour. As the political
climate in Canada becomes more hostile to "welfare cheats" and "profiteers" 178,
it is hoped that governments at the federal and provincial level will not find it
politically expedient to enact workfare requirements without regard to the
ability of such programs to respect the constitutional rights of the recipients as
well as alleviate poverty in Canada. And the numbers of poor persons is greater
than many Canadians believe. A recent UNESCO report concluded that "...there
seems to have been no measurable progress [in Canada] in alleviating poverty

177. Evans, supra, note 41.

178. In general, these fears and concerns are not substantiated by empirical evidence, quite
the contrary-only 1 to 4 percent of welfare recipients commit deliberate fraud: L.
Sarick, "Cheating Less Prevalent than Gossip has it, Studies Indicate", The Globe and
Mail (21 January 1994) Al; Philp, supra, note 126; I. Morrison and A. Mitchell, "It's
open season on welfare", Toronto Star (22 March 1994) A2 1.
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in the last decade, nor in alleviating the severity of poverty among a number of
79
particularly vulnerable groups."1
Rights discourse can successfully operate to curb the harshness of expedient
political reforms. Nevertheless, cushioning welfare recipients with constitutional protection is no long-term solution to pervasive disadvantage. To this end,
this article takes issue with Charles Reich's proclamation that:
Only by making such [welfare] benefits into rights can the welfare state achieve
its goal of providing
a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dig180
nity in a society.

This approach can be dangerous. It can induce the belief that the war against
poverty can be won in the court-room, while neglecting the systemic causes of
poverty in modern society. It denies Ignatieff's observation that the way in which
the state shall allot the benefits flowing from any right to welfare impacts
directly on human dignity. 181
In conclusion, constitutional agitation can, at most, serve as a stop-gap measure
designed to temporarily protect the well-being of those on social assistance. The
Charter,no matter how purposively it is interpreted, can not significantly reduce
the number of poor persons in Canada. Only substantial policy reform can attain
this goal.

179. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, consideration of
the Report submitted by Canada in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Concluding Observations of
the Committee" (May 27, 1993).
180. "The New Property" (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 733 at 786.
181.

Supra, note 107.

